Wherefore Quantum Mechanics? by Boughn, Stephen
Wherefore Quantum Mechanics?† 
 
Stephen Boughn⋇ 
 
Department of Physics, Princeton University, Princeton NJ 
Departments of Physics and Astronomy, Haverford College, Haverford PA 
 
Abstract 
 After	 the	 development	 of	 a	 self-consistent	 quantum	 formalism	 nearly	 a	century	 ago,	 there	 ensued	a	quest	 to	understand	 the	often	 counterintuitive	predictions	 of	 the	 theory.	 These	 endeavors	 invariably	 begin	 with	 the	assumption	 of	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 mathematical	 formalism	 of	 quantum	mechanics	and	then	proceed	to	 investigate	the	theory’s	 implications	 for	the	physical	 world.	 	 One	 of	 the	 outcomes	 has	 been	 endless	 discussions	 of	 the	quantum	measurement	 problem,	 wave/particle	 duality,	 the	 non-locality	 of	entangled	 quantum	 states,	 Schrödinger's	 cat,	 and	 other	 philosophical	conundrums.		In	this	essay,	I	take	the	point	of	view	that	quantum	mechanics	is	a	mathematical	model,	a	human	invention,	and	rather	than	pondering	what	the	theory	implies	about	our	world,	I	consider	the	transposed	question:	what	is	it	about	our	world	that	leads	us	to	a	quantum	mechanical	model	of	it?		One	consequence	is	the	realization	that	discrete	quanta,	the	quantum	of	action	in	particular,	leads	to	the	wave	nature	and	statistical	behavior	of	matter	rather	than	the	other	way	around.	
 
Preface 
 
 Richard Feynman famously declared, “I think I can safely say that nobody really 
understands quantum mechanics.”1  Sean Carroll decried the persistence of this sentiment in a 
recent opinion piece entitled “Even Physicists Don’t Understand Quantum Mechanics: Worse, 
they don’t seem to want to understand it.”2 No one doubts the efficacy of quantum theory.  The 
“understanding” to which these physicists refer is an acceptable ontology of the theoretical 
constructs of quantum mechanics.  A typical query might be, “Do wave functions constitute a 
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true description of physical reality?”3  For a pragmatist like me, this smacks more of metaphysics 
than physics.  I propose a more empirical question: “What is it about our world that has led us to 
a quantum mechanical description of it?”  The purpose of my essay is to answer this question or 
at least shed some light on it.  Before I tell you what I mean by the question, let me tell you what 
I don’t mean. I am not referring to how experimental observations of the details of atomic 
spectra, the spectrum of blackbody radiation, the photoelectric effect, the heat capacity of solids, 
etc, led to the Rutherford-Bohr atomic model and eventually to Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics 
and Schrodinger’s wave mechanics.  The only immediate answer this would seem to provide to 
the above question is something like “Quantum mechanics simply describes the observed 
behavior of Nature”, a rather circular response that isn’t particularly helpful to me in my quest to 
understand why this is the case.  I am definitely not referring to the axiomatic approach of Dirac 
and von Neumann in their development of the mathematical foundations of quantum mechanics 
and the accompanying interpretations of the formal constructs of the theory.  Axiomatic 
approaches in which the equations of quantum mechanics are derived from something more 
fundamental, for example symmetry principles, similarly don’t provide the sort of answer I seek. 
These two comprise the standard textbook presentation of quantum mechanics and have been 
enormously useful to us in our quest to understand nature not to mention in facilitating 
extraordinary advances in technology.  But I want something more.  On the other hand, perhaps 
we should simply accept Feynman’s appraisal and not seek a deeper understanding but rather 
follow the admonition, “Shut up and calculate!”4   
Even so, many have pursued precisely this quest: de Broglie and Bohm’s pilot wave 
theory; Hugh Everett’s many world interpretation; John Bell and his argument for quantum non-
locality; the spontaneous wave function collapse theory of Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber; 
Griffiths, Gell-Mann, and Hartle’s consistent histories interpretation; quantum Bayesianism; and 
many others.  An underlying assumption of all these efforts is that the world is governed by a set 
of comprehensible universal laws.  Once these laws are discovered, it seems eminently 
reasonable to pursue an understanding of them.  Because fundamental laws inevitably take the 
form of formal mathematical models, it’s not surprising that investigations of their meanings 
involve highly theoretical analyses as evidenced by the above examples. Such efforts don’t 																																																								3	This	was	the	question	posed	by	Einstein	in	the	famous	EPR	paper.	(Einstein	et	al.	1935)	4	The	full	David	Mermin	quote	is	“If	I	were	forced	to	sum	up	in	one	sentence	what	the	Copenhagen	interpretation	says	to	me,	it	would	be	‘Shut	up	and	calculate!’”	(Mermin	1989)	
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resonate with me and don’t constitute the sort of understanding that I have in mind.  Perhaps this 
is because I’m an experimental physicist with a disposition for pragmatism.  My philosophy of 
physics5 is much more empirical than theoretical.  For me physical theories are not laws of 
nature but rather human creations, models that we invent to help us make sense of our 
experiences of the world. 
 So just what do I mean by the question “What is it about our world that has led us to a 
quantum mechanical description of it?”  Well, I’m not quite sure.  Maybe I’m searching for 
something analogous to how the constancy of the speed of light leads us to the theory of special 
relativity or to Heisenberg’s attempt at a fundamental understanding of quantum mechanics that 
led to his seminal paper on the uncertainly principle. (I’ll return to Heisenberg’s argument in 
Sections 1 and 4.)  An ancient example is how pre-Socratic philosophers were lead to atomism. 
(See Section 1.)  Because I’m endeavoring to discover the empirical basis for our quantum 
theoretical model, it’s incumbent upon me to avoid, as much as possible, reference to theoretical 
constructs.  This is easier said than done and you will find that I haven’t been entirely successful 
in this regard.  Planck’s quantum of action, ℎ, will figure prominently in the following discussion 
and it’s difficult to discuss it without relying on a mathematical model, which runs counter to my 
intent of avoiding reference to formal theories.  On the other hand, I’m not particularly 
embarrassed by the vagueness that this necessarily introduces into some of my arguments.6  As 
Heisenberg noted about Bohr’s Copenhagen interpretation (Stapp 1972),  
Besides that it may be a point in the Copenhagen interpretation that its  
language has a certain degree of vagueness, and I doubt whether it can  
become clearer by trying to avoid this vagueness. 
My approach to the question I’ve posed will be more heuristic than formal and theoretical.  In 
addition to providing a more empirical understanding of quantum mechanics, I hope that such an 
approach will make some of the mysteries of the theory more palatable and, perhaps, will help to 
dispel some of the intractable quantum conundrums, like the measurement problem.  If you do 
not find this approach of interest, I certainly won’t be offended if you don’t continue reading my 
essay. J 																																																								5	I’ve	expressed	this	view	in	more	detail	in	“On	the	Philosophical	Foundations	of	Physics:	An	Experimentalist’s	Perspective”	(Boughn	2019).	6	In	fact,	the	relation	of	experiments	to	theory	is	fundamentally	vague	even	in	the	context	of	classical	physics	as	will	be	discussed	in	Section	5. 	
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1	Introduction 
 
To be sure, probing well-established theories to discover previously unknown physical 
phenomena is a tried-and-true enterprise in physics.  Examples include: electromagnetic 
radiation; neutron stars; antimatter; Bose-Einstein	condensation;	neutrinos; gravitational waves; 
the Higgs boson; and many more.  In no way is my intention to minimize these wonderful 
predictions and their subsequent experimental confirmation.  They all involve specific 
observable effects predicted by physical theories.  Such predictions are possible because of the 
well-defined meaning of statements made within the context of the theories.  However, the 
quantum conundrums alluded to in the preface are paradoxes of a different sort.  They include 
wave function collapse, action at a distance, Schrodinger’s cat, the quantum/classical divide, and 
perhaps even wave/particle duality.  These all arise from trying to conjure new meanings of 
theoretical constructs, meanings that were not included in the foundations of the theory.  I’ve 
discussed the futility of such efforts elsewhere (Boughn & Reginatto 2013, Boughn 2019).  One 
purpose of the present essay is to redirect those queries from questions about the metaphysics of 
the quantum formalism to the question, what is it about the physical world that has led us to 
invent that formalism.  
 Heisenberg was, perhaps, the first to address such a question.  His seminal 1927 paper 
employed a gedanken experiment, in the form of a gamma ray microscope, to establish an 
indeterminacy relation, 𝛿𝑥𝛿𝑝 ∼ ℎ.  In the abstract he remarked, “This indeterminacy is the real 
basis for the occurrence of statistical relations in quantum mechanics.”  The title of the paper, 
“Über den anschaulichen Inhalt der quantentheoretischen Kinematik und Mechanik”, was 
translated by Wheeler & Zurek(1983) as “The Physical Content of Quantum Kinematics and 
Mechanics”.  The German phrase anschaulichen inhalt has been variously translated as physical 
content (Wheeler & Zurek 1983), intuitive contents (Miller 1994), and perceptual content 
(Cassidy 1992).  It is clear that Heisenberg was trying to render quantum mechanics more 
anschaulich by appealing to an empirical property of nature, in this case demonstrated with his 
gamma ray microscope.7   
 Before proceeding, it’s necessary to define what is meant by “a quantum mechanical 
description” of nature.  The formalism of quantum mechanics is based on specifying the 																																																								7	We’ll	come	back	to	Heisenberg’s	paper	in	Section	4.	
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quantum state of a system in terms of either the Schrodinger wave function or Hilbert state 
vector and a Hamiltonian that describes the evolution of the quantum state.  The meanings of 
these theoretical constructs derive from the way physicists use them.  Perhaps the simplest way 
of expressing this meaning is associated with the Copenhagen interpretation of Bohr and 
Heisenberg.  Consider a quantum system characterized by a wave function 𝜓(𝑥) and suppose 
that a property characterized by an operator 𝑨 is to be measured for this system.  Further suppose 
that 𝜙!(𝑥) represent the eigenfunctions of 𝑨 such that 𝑨𝜙! = 𝑎!𝜙! where 𝑎! are the 
eigenvalues of 𝑨 and constitute all possible results for measurements of the given property.  
According to the Born rule, the probability that a measurement characterized by 𝑨 will yield the 
value 𝑎! is given by 𝑑𝑥 𝜓𝜙! !.  These relations encompass what we mean by the quantum 
state and quantum operator.  The statistical aspects of quantum mechanics follows directly from 
the Born rule while the wave/particle duality implied by the Copenhagen interpretation is a 
consequence of this rule and the Hamiltonian operator that governs the structure and evolution of 
the wave function.  Of course, quantum mechanics proper encompasses far more than this simple 
example; however, the meanings of all the theoretical constructs (like 𝜓(𝑥) and 𝑨) are derived 
from similar considerations.  The question remains, why are we lead to such a description of the 
natural world. 
 First, let’s list a few of the counterintuitive aspects of quantum mechanics.  Perhaps the  
most egregious example is the observation that electrons and light exhibit both the properties of 
particles and the properties of waves, behavior that is anathema to classical physics.  The 
Schrodinger wave function certainly pointed to the wave properties of particles and led De 
Broglie and Schrodinger to interpret quantum waves as continuous distributions of matter.  It 
was Einstein and Born who introduced statistics to quantum mechanics by suggesting that the 
wave function provides a statistical measure of where a particle of radiation or matter might be 
located 8 (Stone 2013).  After 1930, the Copenhagen interpretation of Bohr and Heisenberg was 
generally accepted; although, Bohr and Heisenberg often emphasized different aspects of the 
interpretation and there has never been complete agreement as to its meaning even among its 
proponents (Stapp 1972). The Copenhagen interpretation dealt with the incongruous dual wave 
and particle properties by embracing Bohr's principle of complementarity according to which 
complementary features of physical systems can only be accessed by experiments designed to 																																																								8	One can appreciate the irony since it was the statistical aspects of quantum mechanics that most bothered Einstein.  
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observe one or the other but not both of these features. For example, one can observe either the 
particle behavior or wave behavior of electrons but not both at the same time. In addition, the 
waves implicit in Schrodinger’s equation were interpreted in terms of probability amplitudes for 
the outcomes of experiments. Finally, in order to facilitate the relation of quantum formalism to 
experimental results, the Copenhagen interpretation emphasized that the description of 
experiments, which invariably involve macroscopic apparatus, must be expressed in classical 
terms.  These aspects of quantum theory are familiar to all beginning students of quantum 
mechanics; however, many students harbor the uneasy feeling that something is missing. How 
can an electron in some circumstances exhibit the properties of a particle and at other times 
exhibit the properties of a wave? How is it that the primary theoretical constructs of quantum 
mechanics, the Schrodinger wave functions or Hilbert state vectors, only indicate the probability 
of events? Quantum mechanics itself does not seem to indicate that any event actually happens. 
Why is it that experiments are only to be described classically? Where is the quantum/classical 
divide between the quantum system and the classical measurement and what governs interactions 
across this divide?  In fact, these sorts of questions are raised not only by neophyte students of 
quantum mechanics but also by seasoned practitioners. In actuality, the question of how to 
interpret quantum theory has never been fully answered and new points of view are still being 
proffered.  
 Seeking answers to these questions is a long and venerated enterprise that has been 
pursued by philosophers and theoretical physicists alike.   These pursuits, far from being idle 
avocations, have resulted in important contributions to the foundations of quantum mechanics.  
However, the purpose of this essay is to address a different, more epistemological question, 
“What is it about the physical world that leads us to a quantum theoretic model of it?", a question 
that is still pondered by some physicists and philosophers and certainly by many physics students 
when they first encounter quantum mechanics. Most of the latter group eventually come to some 
understanding, perhaps via the ubiquitous Copenhagen interpretation, and then proceed 
according to the “shut up and calculate" maxim.  One modest aim of this essay is to provide such 
students with a heuristic perspective on quantum mechanics that might enable them to proceed to 
calculations without first having to “shut up". 
 
 
	 7	
2 What’s Quantized? 
 
Let us begin by asking where the ‘quantum’ in quantum mechanics comes from. What is 
it that’s quantized? That matter is composed of discrete quanta, atoms, was contemplated by 
Greek philosophers in the 5!! century B.C. (Berryman 2011) and the idea continued to be 
espoused through the 18!! century. Even though it wasn’t until the 19!! and early 20!! centuries 
that the existence of atoms was placed on a firm empirical basis, it’s not difficult to imagine what 
led early philosophers to an atomistic model. Perhaps the primary motivation, an argument that 
still resonates today, was to address the puzzle of change, the transformation of matter. This was 
often expressed by the assertion that things cannot come from nothing nor can they ever return to 
nothing. Rather, creation, destruction, and change are most simply explained by the 
rearrangement of the atomic constituents of matter. In his epic poem, De rerum natura (On the 
Nature of Things, circa 55 BC), Lucretius9 explained (translation by R. Melville 1997), 
...no single thing returns to nothing but at its dissolution everything  
returns to matter’s primal particles...they must for sure consist of  
changeless matter. For if the primal atoms could suffer change...then  
no more would certainty exist of what can be and what cannot...Nor  
could so oft the race of men repeat the nature, manners, habits of their  
parents.10 
While it took nearly 2500 years, this conjecture of the atomists was largely justified.  
One might also reasonably ask, “Are there other aspects of nature that are quantized?” 
It’s no coincidence that during the same period that saw the confirmation of the atomic 
hypothesis, there appeared evidence for the discrete nature of atomic interactions. Perhaps the 
first clues were the early 19th century observations by Wollaston and Fraunhofer of discrete 
absorption lines in the spectrum of the sun and in 1859 the subsequent identification of emission 
lines in the spectra of elements in the laboratory by Kirchoff and Bunsen. In 1888, Rydberg was 
able to relate the wavelengths of these discrete spectral lines to ratios of integers. Boltzmann 
introduced discrete energy as early as 1868 but only as a computational device in statistical 
mechanics. It was in 1900 that Planck found he must take such quantization more seriously in his 
derivation of the Planck black body formula (Badino 2009). A decade later Jeans, Poincare, and 																																																								9	Lucretius	was	a	disciple	of	the	Greek	atomist	Epicurus	and	his	predecessors	Democritus	and	Leucippus	(Berryman	2011).	10	One	might	balk	at	attributing	human	characteristics	to	atoms;	however,	microscopic	genes	composed	of	atoms	certainly	also	qualify	as	(ordinarily)	changeless	primal	particles.	
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Ehrenfest demonstrated that the discreteness of energy states, which source black body radiation, 
follows from the general morphology of the spectrum and is not the consequence of precisely 
fitting the observed spectral data (Norton 1993). In 1905 Einstein introduced the notion of quanta 
of light with energies E that depended on frequency 𝜈 with precisely the same relation as 
introduced by Planck11, 𝐸 = ℎ𝜈, where ℎ is Planck’s constant.  He then used this relation to 
explain qualitative observations of the photoelectric effect.12  In 1907 it was again Einstein who 
demonstrated that energy quantization of harmonic oscillators explained why the heat capacities 
of solids decrease at low temperatures. Finally, Bohr’s 1913 model of discrete energy levels of 
electrons in atoms explained the spectral lines of Kirchoff and Bunsen as well as resolved the 
conflict of Maxwell’s electrodynamics with the stability of Rutherford’s 1911 nuclear atomic 
model. 
In a 1922 conversation with Heisenberg (Heisenberg 1972), Bohr expressed an argument 
for the discreteness of atomic interactions that harkened back to the ancient Greeks’ arguments 
for atoms (and to the Lucretius quote above). Bohr based his argument on the stability of matter, 
but not in the sense just mentioned. Bohr explained, 
  By ‘stability’ I mean that the same substances always have the same  
properties, that the same crystals recur, the same chemical compounds,  
etc.  In other words, even after a host of changes due to external  
influences, an iron atom will always remain an iron atom, with exactly  
the same properties as before. This cannot be explained by the principles  
of classical mechanics...according to which all effects have precisely  
determined causes, and according to which the present state of a  
phenomenon or process is fully determined by the one that immediately  
preceded it. 
In other words, in a world composed of Rutherford atoms, quantum discreteness is necessary in 
order to preserve the simplicity and regularity of nature. Bohr’s ‘stability’ and Lucretius’s 
‘repeatability’ clearly refer to the same aspect of nature.  
It might appear from the examples given above that energy is the key dynamical quantity 																																																								11	It	is	interesting	that	in	1899,	the	year	before	his	seminal	Planck’s	Law	paper,	Planck	introduced	the	constant	that	bears	his	name	(although	he	gave	it	the	symbol	b,	not	h)	from	Paschen’s	fit	of	spectral	data	to	Wien’s	Law.	Even	then,	he	identified	it	as	a	fundamental	constant	of	nature	along	side	e,	c,	and	G.	(Planck	1899)	12	Einstein’s	quantitative	prediction	was	confirmed	by	the	1914	experiments	of	Robert	Millikan.  	
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that must always come in discrete quanta. However, there are problems with this demand. For 
one thing, there is no fundamental constant in physics, such as the speed of light c, Planck’s 
constant h, or Newton’s constant G, that has the units of energy.13  In addition, it’s 
straightforward to demonstrate that energy is not quantized in all situations. Even in the context 
of quantum mechanics, a free particle can assume any of a continuum of values of energy and 
momentum and there are many interactions (e.g., Rutherford and Compton scattering) for which 
a particle’s energy and momentum change by arbitrarily small increments.  Certainly there are 
many instances of the quantization of energy E, momentum p, and even position x; however, the 
values of these quanta depend on the specifics of the system and have a wide range of values. 
For example, the energy and momentum in a monochromatic beam of photons are quantized in 
units of ℎ𝜈 and ℎ𝜈/c but the values of these quanta depend on the frequency of the photons and 
are unconstrained; they can take on any value between 0 and ∞, which again argues against their 
primal status. 
Angular momentum would seem to be a more likely candidate for the quantum that 
characterizes atomic interactions.  Indeed, there is a fundamental physical constant that has the 
units of angular momentum, namely Planck’s constant, h.  In fact, a key tenant of Bohr’s atomic 
model was the quantization of angular momentum. On the other hand, that such a specific 
quantity as angular momentum should occupy this primal status might give one pause.  To be 
sure, in the context of standard quantum mechanics, the quantum state of a particle can always be 
expressed as a linear combination of angular momentum eigenfunctions (spherical harmonics), 
with eigenvalues 𝑳! = 𝑚ℏ and 𝑳! = 𝑙 𝑙 + 1 ℏ!, where 𝑳 and 𝑳! are the angular momentum 
operator and its z component, m and l are integers, and ℏ ≡ ℎ/2𝜋.  However, recall that the 
modus operandi of this essay is to avoid drawing inferences from quantum formalism but instead 
to identify empirical properties of nature that lead us to a quantum mechanical description of it.  
An alternate approach might be to consider the quantization of some specific combination 
of E, p, and x. In fact, Heisenberg’s indeterminacy relation (Heisenberg 1927), 𝛿𝑥𝛿𝑝 ∼ ℎ, points 
to the product of position and momentum as such a combination and we will see that this is, 
indeed, prescient. It is not inappropriate to invoke indeterminacy in this context because 
Heisenberg arrived at his relation, not from quantum mechanics, but rather from an empirical 																																																								13	To	be	sure,	the	Planck	energy,	 ℏ𝑐! 𝐺,	is	fundamental	but	is	much	too	large	(2	×	109	Joules)	to	be	relevant	on	atomic	scales.	
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gedanken experiment involving a gamma ray microscope, as will be discussed later.  
In 1912, Nicholson proposed that the angular momentum of an electron in orbit about an 
atomic nucleus is quantized and the following year Ehrenfest argued that the unit of this quantum 
is ℏ ≡ ℎ/2𝜋. In the same year, Bohr incorporated these ideas into his model of an atom, a model 
that provided a successful explanation of the spectrum of atomic hydrogen. Even though ℏ has 
the same units as angular momentum, recall that I expressed skepticism that angular momentum 
characterizes the fundamental quantum of interaction. Wilson, Ishiwara, Epstein, and 
Sommerfeld soon replaced Nicholoson/Ehrenfest/Bohr quantization with the notion that 
Hamilton-Jacobi action variables 𝐽! (for periodic systems), which also have the same units as ℎ, 
are quantized (Whittaker 1989). That is, 𝐽! ≡ 𝑝!𝑑𝑥! = 𝑛ℎ where 𝑝! is the momentum 
conjugate to the coordinate 𝑥!, 𝑛 is an integer, and the integral is taken over one cycle of 
periodic motion. On the other hand, the quantization of action depends on the coordinates 
employed, which again seems unacceptable for a fundamental principle. 
In 1917 Einstein gave a new interpretation of the quantization conditions by 
demonstrating that they followed from the requirement that Hamilton’s principle function S is 
multivalued such that the change in S around any closed curve in configuration space is an 
integer times Planck’s constant, i.e., 𝑝!𝑑𝑥! = 𝜕𝑆 𝜕𝑞! 𝑑𝑞! = 𝑑𝑆 = 𝑛ℎ (Stone 2005). 
This geometric expression no longer depends on the choice of coordinates.  It is straightforward 
to demonstrate that the quantization of energy for harmonic oscillators and photons, as well as 
angular momentum quantization in the Bohr atom, follow from the quantization of the Hamilton-
Jacobi action, 𝑑𝑆 = 𝑛ℎ. 
Even though the Hamiltonian action integral is a quantity defined in the context of 
classical mechanics, it is certainly a theoretical construct (as are energy, momentum, and angular 
momentum for that matter) and therefore runs counter to my desire to construct an empirical 
basis for our quantum theoretical model, a shortcoming of which you’ve been forewarned. 
However, the description of nearly any observation necessarily requires some sort of theoretical 
basis and a classical description is perhaps the lesser of evils.  Also, the above argument is semi-
classical and, as such, it’s difficult to imagine how it could provide a firm foundation for modern 
quantum theory. However, the reader should be reminded that the purpose of this essay is not an 
axiomatic derivation of quantum mechanics from fundamental principles but rather to acquire 
insight into the quantum world and thus address the question, “What is it about the physical 
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world that led us to a quantum theoretic model of it?” I now continue with this task. 
 
3 Quantization and Waves 
 
 Duane (1923), Breit (1923) and Compton (1923) applied the quantization of action to the 
interaction of x-ray photons with an infinite, periodic crystal lattice and were able to obtain 
Bragg’s law of diffraction without directly invoking the wave nature of x-rays. A somewhat 
simpler case is that of photons incident upon an infinite diffraction grating. Figure 1 is a replica 
of the schematic diagram in Breit’s 1923 paper where ℎ𝜈 𝑐 = 𝑝! is the momentum of the 
incident photon, G is the diffraction grating, 𝐷!, 𝐷±!, 𝐷±!, ... are the positions of the slits of the 
grating, θ is the scattering angle, and P is the transverse momentum of the emergent photon. 
Now assume that the momentum transferred from the radiation to the grating is governed by the 
    
 
Figure 1: Photon scattered from an infinite diffraction grating from Breit (1923) 
 
quantization condition 𝑝𝑑𝑥 = 𝑛ℎ where 𝑝 is in a direction parallel to its surface and the 
integral is taken over the transverse distance necessary to bring the system back to its original 
condition, i.e., the line spacing 𝑑 = 𝐷!!! − 𝐷!.  In this case, the average momentum transferred 
to the grating is 𝑝 = 𝑝 𝑑𝑥 𝑑𝑥 = 𝑛ℎ 𝑑 and by conservation of momentum this must also be 
the magnitude of the transverse momentum transferred to an incident photon, i.e., 𝑃 = 𝑝 . If 
photons are incident perpendicular to the plane of the grating, then the allowed angles at which 
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they are transmitted through the grating are given by 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃! = 𝑝 𝑝!.14  Thus, 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝜃! = 𝑛ℎ 𝑝!𝑑, 
which is the relation for diffraction (interference) of a wave with wavelength 𝜆 = ℎ 𝑝!.  No 
specific reference to the wave nature of the photons is necessary.  Breit (1923) and Epstein & 
Ehrenfest (1924) extended these results to finite width, single and multiple slit interference 
patterns. Thus, the quantization condition 𝑝𝑑𝑥 = 𝑛ℎ leads to the interference properties of 
photons without directly invoking their wave nature. It is curious that none of these authors 
extended their analyses to the case of electrons scattered from crystals, a process that should 
obey the same quantization condition. If they had, they might have predicted that 𝜆 = ℎ 𝑝 and 
the wave nature of electrons prior to de Broglie’s 1924 thesis and Davisson & Germer’s and 
Thomson’s 1927 electron diffraction experiments. The analyses of Duane et al. provide seminal 
illustrations of a direct path from the quantization of action to the wave behavior of particles and 
photons. As such, they lend credence to the notion that there is a primal relation between the 
quantization of dynamical properties and the dual wave-particle behavior of quantum systems. 
 
4 Physics and Probability 
 
Another major conundrum of quantum mechanics is the fundamental role of probability 
in the theory.15  The probabilities are taken to apply to the outcomes of possible observations of a 
system even though some of the observations are mutually exclusive (Bohr’s principle of 
complementarity). This seems to fly in the face of our classical notion that physical systems 
should be completely describable in isolation, prior to and independent of any observation. How 
is it that the specification of mere probabilities can possibly constitute a fundamental description 
of a physical system and if so, how can such a description possibly provide a complete 
description of reality?16	In 1927 Heisenberg proposed the indeterminacy relation, 𝛿𝑥𝛿𝑝~ℎ, that 
bears his name. It was his contention that “this indeterminacy is the real basis for the occurrence 
of statistical relations in quantum mechanics.”(Heisenberg 1927)  He arrived at the concept by 																																																								14	Because	the	mass	of	the	grating	is	very	large,	the	momentum	and	energy	of	the	scattered	photon,	pγ	and	pγc,	do	not	change,	a	result	that	follows	from	the	Compton	effect	discovered	only	a	few	months	earlier.	15	It	was	Einstein	who	first	suggested	that	the	intensity	of	electromagnetic	waves	was	a	measure	of	the	probability	of	the	location	of	photons.	Born	extended	this	notion	to	particles	with	a	similar	interpretation	of	the	wave	functions	of	Schrodinger’s	equation	(Stone	2013).	16	In	fact,	Einstein,	Podolsky,	and	Rosen	(1935)	maintained	“that	the	description	of	reality	as	given	by	a	[quantum]	wave	function	is	not	complete.”	
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considering a gedanken experiment in the form of a gamma ray microscope. Heisenberg 
reasoned that with such a microscope one could only determine an electron’s position to within 
on the order of one gamma ray wavelength, 𝛿𝑥~𝜆. But in doing so, one would impart to the 
electron an unknown momentum on the order of the momentum of the incident gamma ray, 𝛿𝑝~𝐸! 𝑐 = ℎ𝜈 𝑐 = ℎ 𝜆,  and hence 𝛿𝑥𝛿𝑝 ∼ ℎ.17 To the extent that the wave behavior of 
gamma rays follows from quantization, as demonstrated by Duane et al., the Heisenberg 
indeterminacy relation is a direct consequence of the quantum of action. Heisenberg 
demonstrated that this relation can also be determined directly from the formalism of quantum 
mechanics; however, our point here is that it is already evident from the quantization of action.  	
The Heisenberg uncertainty principle is one of the pillars of modern physics and his 
gamma ray microscope provides a particularly intuitive interpretation of the principle. However, 
there are other insightful gedanken experiments that are more directly tied to quantization. For 
example, suppose a particle is confined to be within a one-dimensional box (potential well) of 
width 𝑙 but is otherwise free, i.e., has constant momentum 𝑝 along the one dimension but in 
either direction. The motion of the particle will clearly be periodic with a spatial period 2𝑙 and 
the quantization condition is 𝑝𝑑𝑥 = 2𝑝𝑙 = 𝑛ℎ.  If the particle is in its ground state, 𝑛 = 1 and 2𝑝𝑙 = ℎ.  At any instant, the uncertainty in the particle’s position is clearly 𝛿𝑥 ∼  𝑙. The 
magnitude of the particle’s momentum is known but it could be moving in either direction so the 
uncertainty in its momentum is 𝛿𝑝 ∼  ℎ 𝑙.  Combining these two relations, we again arrive at 
Heisenberg’s indeterminacy relation, 𝛿𝑥𝛿𝑝 ∼ ℎ. Of course, this particle is confined; however, if 
the box is opened, the particle is free to move in either direction. Immediately after the box is 
opened, the uncertainties in the position and momentum of the now free particle again satisfy the 
Heisenberg relation, 𝛿𝑥𝛿𝑝 ∼ ℎ.  
The argument that Heisenberg gave to support his contention that his indeterminacy 
relation is the basis for the statistical relations in quantum mechanics is as follows (Heisenberg 
1927), 
We have not assumed that quantum theory–in opposition to classical theory– 
is an essentially statistical theory in the sense that only statistical conclusions  
can be drawn from precise statistical data....Rather, in all cases in which  
relations exist in classical theory between quantities which are really exactly  																																																								17	Heisenberg	also	argued	that	similar	indeterminacy	relations	occurred	for	all	conjugate	pairs	of	observable	quantities.	
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measurable, the corresponding exact relations also hold in quantum theory  
(laws of conservation of momentum and energy). But what is wrong in the  
sharp formulation of the law of causality, “When we know the present precisely,  
we can predict the future,” is not the conclusion but the assumption. Even in  
principle we cannot know the present in all detail. For that reason everything  
observed is a selection from a plenitude of possibilities and a limitation on what  
is possible in the future.  
Another reason to concede to a statistical view of nature is the realization that this notion 
is not particularly foreign to classical physics. Certainly, statistical mechanics is one of the 
triumphal successes of classical physics. On the experimental side, careful consideration of 
uncertainties is always essential when comparing observations with theoretical predictions, either 
quantum or classical. In the classical case these uncertainties are usually viewed as experimental 
“noise” and left to the experimentalist to elucidate. However, this doesn’t necessarily have to be 
the case. The Hamilton-Jacobi formalism provides an approach in which such uncertainties can 
be included in the fundamental equations of classical mechanics18 (Hall and Reginatto 2005, 
2016); although, it is usually far more convenient to deal with them in the analysis of a 
measurement rather than as fundamental facet of the theory. An interesting aside is that by 
combining the statistical Hamilton-Jacobi formalism of classical mechanics with the Heisenberg 
uncertainty relations, one can generate a plausible route to Schrodinger’s equation and the 
concomitant wave nature of particles (Hall & Reginatto 2002, Boughn & Reginatto 2018). One 
can even construe statistical relations in classical physics in terms of classical indeterminacy 
relations 𝛿𝑥 > 0 and 𝛿𝑝 > 0 (Volovich 2011). In a very real sense, violations of these relations, 
namely 𝛿𝑥 = 0 or 𝛿𝑝 = 0, are just as inaccessible as a violation of the quantum mechanical 
uncertainty principle, 𝛿𝑥𝛿𝑝 < ℏ 2, an assertion to which any experimentalist will attest.19  
These arguments are certainly not intended to demonstrate that quantum mechanics and classical 
mechanics are compatible. Clearly, they are not. They are offered simply to emphasize that 
probability and statistics are fundamental to physics, both classical and quantum. Rather, the 
crucial difference between the two is the quantization of action that is primal in quantum physics 
but absent in classical physics.  To be sure, it is for this reason that the statistical nature of 																																																								18	In	fact,	some	experimental	uncertainties	are	routinely	included	in	quantum	mechanical	calculations	expressed	as	the	weightings	in	mixed	states.	19	Note	that	here	I’ve	replaced	Heisenberg’s	𝛿𝑥𝛿𝑝 ∼ ℎ	with	the	usual	𝛿𝑥𝛿𝑝 ≥ ℏ 2,	which	is	derived	from	the	corresponding	quantum	mechanical	commutation	relation.	
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quantum mechanics (via the Born rule) seems to be more fundamental than in classical 
mechanics.  
Because the notion of discrete quanta of both matter and physical interactions figures so 
prominently in this essay, let me speculate about a connection between discrete quanta and a 
statistical model of nature.  Heisenberg’s argument certainly points in this direction; however, I 
want to be a bit more general.  In everyday experience when we encounter discrete phenomena 
we often resort to probabilistic descriptions. Examples include flipping a coin, rolling dice, 
spinning a roulette wheel, and employing a Galton board to visualize a binomial (and 
approximately normal) statistical distribution.  One might object that such descriptions are only 
statistical because we lack precise knowledge of the original state of the object but this objection 
already invokes Newtonian theory, which I’m endeavoring to avoid.  I’m only drawing on 
“everyday experiences” for insight into how one might describe nature.  Also, precise knowledge 
of the original state (in the Newtonian sense) is problematic because to achieve this one would 
have to interrogate the system via discrete interactions with another system whose state must also 
be precisely known, and so on ad infinitum, which brings us back to Heisenberg’s argument 
based on his indeterminacy relation. Two 19th century microscopic examples are: Gregor 
Mendel’s observations of the statistical behavior of the inheritance patterns of pea plants that led 
him to introduce the concept of discrete inherited units; and Boltzmann’s introduction of discrete 
units of energy as a computational device in statistical mechanics.  To me, these illustrations are 
an indication as to why it should be no surprise that a world characterized by discrete quanta 
might lead to a fundamentally statistical model of nature. 
 
5 The Quantum/Classical Divide 
 
The dual wave-particle nature of matter and radiation and the probabilistic character of 
the theory are not the only elements that exasperate beginning students of quantum mechanics. 
Another point of discomfort is the quantum/classical divide that the Copenhagen interpretation 
places between a quantum system and a classical measuring apparatus. Where is the divide and 
what physical interactions occur across the divide? This dilemma is predicated upon the 
supposition that experiments must be, or inevitably are, described by classical physics. Upon 
closer inspection, the assertion that classical physics adequately describes experiments is far 
from obvious. Bohr expressed the situation as follows (Bohr 1963):  
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The decisive point is to recognize that the description of the  
experimental arrangement and the recordings of observations must  
be given in plain language, suitably refined by the usual terminology.  
This is a simple logical demand, since by the word ‘experiment’ we  
can only mean a procedure regarding which we are able to communicate  
to others what we have done and what we have learnt. 
Stapp (1972) chose to emphasize this pragmatic view of classicality by using the word 
specifications, i.e.,  
Specifications are what architects and builders, and mechanics and  
machinists, use to communicate to one another conditions on the  
concrete social realities or actualities that bind their lives together.   
It is hard to think of a theoretical concept that could have a more  
objective meaning. Specifications are described in technical jargon  
that is an extension of everyday language. This language may  
incorporate concepts from classical physics. But this fact in no way  
implies that these concepts are valid beyond the realm in which they  
are used by technicians.  
The bottom line is that descriptions of experiments are invariably given in terms of operational 
prescriptions or specifications that can be communicated to technicians, engineers, and the 
physics community at large. The formalism of quantum mechanics has absolutely nothing to say 
about experiments.  
There have been many proposed theoretical resolutions to the problem of the 
quantum/classical divide but none of them seem adequate (e.g., Boughn & Reginatto 2013). One 
obvious approach is simply to treat the measuring apparatus as a quantum mechanical system. 
While perhaps impractical, no one doubts that quantum mechanics applies to the bulk properties 
of matter and so this path might, in principle, seem reasonable. However to the extent that it can 
be accomplished, the apparatus becomes part of the (probabilistic) quantum mechanical system 
for which yet another measuring apparatus is required to observe the combined system. 
Heisenberg expressed this in the extreme case, “One may treat the whole world as one 
mechanical system, but then only a mathematical problem remains while access to observation is 
closed off.”(Schlosshauer & Camilleri 2008) 
Ultimately, the dilemma of the quantum/classical divide or rather system/experiment 
divide is a faux problem. Precisely the same situation occurs in classical physics but apparently 
has not been considered problematic. Are the operational prescriptions of experiments part and 
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parcel of classical theory? Are they couched in terms of point particles, rigid solid bodies, 
Newton’s laws or Hamilton-Jacobi theory?  Of course not. They are part of Bohr’s “procedure 
regarding which we are able to communicate to others what we have done and what we have 
learnt.” Therefore, it seems that the problem of the relation of theory and measurement doesn’t 
arise with quantum mechanics but exists in classical mechanics as well. At a 1962 conference on 
the foundations of quantum mechanics, Wendell Furry explained (Furry 1962),  
So that in quantum theory we have something not really worse than  
we had in classical theory. In both theories you don’t say what you  
do when you make a measurement, what the process is. But in  
quantum theory we have our attention focused on this situation.  
And we do become uncomfortable about it, because we have to talk  
about the effects of the measurement on the systems....I am asking for  
something that the formalism doesn’t contain, finally when you  
describe a measurement. Now, classical theory doesn’t contain any  
description of measurement. It doesn’t contain anywhere near as much  
theory of measurement as we have here [in quantum mechanics]. There  
is a gap in the quantum mechanical theory of measurement. In classical  
theory there is practically no theory of measurement at all, as far as I know.  
At that same conference Eugene Wigner put it like this (Wigner 1962),  
Now, how does the experimentalist know that this apparatus will measure  
for him the position? “Oh”, you say, “he observed that apparatus. He  
looked at it.” Well that means that he carried out a measurement on it.  
How did he know that the apparatus with which he carried out that  
measurement will tell him the properties of the apparatus? Fundamentally,  
this is again a chain which has no beginning. And at the end we have to  
say, “We learned that as children how to judge what is around us.” And  
there is no way to do this scientifically. The fact that in quantum mechanics  
we try to analyze the measurement process only brought this home to us  
that much sharply.  
Physicists have long since become comfortable with the relation between theory and 
measurement in classical physics so, perhaps, the quantum case shouldn’t be regarded as 
particularly worrisome. 
 
6  Back to Quanta 
 
 I began this essay with the question “What is it about the physical world around us that 
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leads us to a quantum theoretic model of it?” and have tried to answer it by discussing the 
quantal character of the physical world along with the inevitability of the statistical nature of 
both quantum and classical physics. In addition, when compared with its classical counterpart, 
the relationship of theory and measurement in quantum mechanics doesn't seem all that unusual.  
I suspect that many of those who, like Feynman, lament not understanding quantum mechanics 
would claim that such notions as quantum interference, quantum non-locality, and wave-particle 
duality simply don’t make sense.  However, I hope I’ve convinced you that once one accepts the 
fundamental nature of the quantum these notions do make sense.  On the other hand, the Greek 
atomists couldn’t make sense of nature without quanta of matter and, as Bohr pointed out, this 
was also the case without discrete quanta of atomic interactions (see Section 2).  In fact, in the 
absence of the notion of the quantum discreteness, it is the classical theory of nature, not the 
quantum theory, that makes no sense.  
I hope these musings will provide some comfort to beginning students of quantum 
mechanics by providing a heuristic answer that bears upon the epistemological origin of wave-
particle duality, the probabilistic interpretation of quantum formalism, and the somewhat elusive 
connection of theoretical formalism and measurements. Perhaps they will be afforded some 
solace as their credulity is strained by references to the quantum/classical divide, the collapse of 
the wave function, and the spooky action at a distance of entangled quantum systems. I 
personally suspect that the quagmire to which we are led by these issues is spawned by 
conflating the physical world with the mathematical formalism that is intended only to model it, 
but this is a topic for another conversation (Boughn 2019). 
The purpose of this essay is neither to completely demystify quantum mechanics nor to 
stifle conversation about its interpretation. To be sure, the number of extraordinary quantum 
phenomena seems to be nearly without limit. Quantum spin, anti-matter, field theory, gauge 
symmetry, the standard model of elementary particles, etc., are all subsequent developments in 
quantum theory that have very little connection to classical physics and about which the above 
discussion has little to say. Certainly wave-particle duality is a mysterious fact of nature. 
Whether one considers it to be a fundamental principle, as did Bohr, or sees it as intimately 
related to the quantal character of the world is, perhaps, a matter of taste. I have sought to couch 
my discussion not in the mathematical formalism of quantum theory, but in terms of a simple 
physical principle: matter, radiation, and their interactions occur only in discreet quanta. Rather 
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than quashing discussion about the meaning of quantum mechanics, perhaps this essay will 
stimulate new discussions. 
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